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SOME INFLUENCES OF JUSTICE HOLMES' THOUGHT
ON CURRENT LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
By PERLIE P. FALLON*
Interstate Con mmerce
T WAS in Swift and Company v. United States,' that justice
Holmes declared that commerce between the states is not a
technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course
of business. This involved cattle sent from one state for sale in
another state under a course of business by which they were held
in stock yards in a still different state in which the purchasing took
place before the cattle were sent to slaughtering places in other
states. The petitioners were indicted for a violation of the Sher-
man Act by conspiring to restrain commerce and not to compete
in the purchase of the cattle. It was held that the transaction
evidenced a current of commerce among the states in which the
purchase of the cattle was a mere incident. The claim that the
cattle had come to rest when the acts which were the basis of the
indictment had happened was held to be inconsistent with the
actual business practice. An application of this rule was made in
1942, in Walling v. Jacksonville Paper C0.,2 in which employees
delivering goods shipped in interstate commerce which had tem-
porarily come to rest in a warehouse were held subject to the Fair
Labor Standards Act. Justice Holmes, in the Swift Case, also
made a reference to the question of taxation which was to be de-
cisive of future law, and which will be fully considered in the
course of the subsequent discussion.
The realism of the Swift Case in defining commerce was applied
again in Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi,3 in which sale and de-
livery of gasoline was made in Mississippi to shrimp packers on a
bill of lading consigned to the shrimp fishers in Louisiana, but at
*Mjember of the'bar of New York and the Supreme Court of the United
States.
'(1905) 196 U. S. 375, 399, 25 S. Ct. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518. See also
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Foster, (1918) 247 U. S. 105, 38 S. Ct.
438, 62 L. Ed. 1006, holding that the telegraphic transmission of quotations
of stocks on the New York Stock Exchange from New York to Massachu-
setts for further transmission to brokers' offices therein over tickers con-
stituted interstate commerce until ultimate delivery to such brokers' offices,
and as such immune from regulation by Massachusetts authorities.
2(1942) 317 U. S. 564, 63 S. Ct. 332, 87 L. Ed. 460.
3(1930) 280 U. S. 390, 50 S. Ct. 169, 74 L. Ed. 504.
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the packers' risk. The Mississippi sales tax was allowed to apply
since it was held not invalid as a tax on interstate commerce. The
contract could not make the sale such. The opinion of Justice
Holmes stressed the fact that the sale had been completed before
the interstate movement had commenced despite the existence of
a rather uniform practice of the vendee to ship the gasoline out-
side the taxing state. In another case he concurred in the dissent
of Justice Lamar in contending that a railroad employee carrying
bolts to repair a bridge used in interstate commerce was not en-
gaged in interstate commerce under the provisions of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.4 The confusion occurring in the con-
struction of that statute by drawing a distinction between acts
affecting commerce and those not affecting commerce was pointed
out in 1943 in McLeod v. Threlkeld.5 The Fair Labor Standards
Act has avoided this pitfall by distinguishing between "engaged
in commerce" (work so intimately related to commerce as to be
a part thereof) and "production of goods for commerce."
The dualism of our federal system of government has raised
many questions as to wlat, if any, power the states have respect-
ing interstate commerce or its instrumentalities through the exer-
cise of their governmental powers. The conflicts which arise from
exercises of their taxing powers must be reserved for later dis-
cussion. In so far as they have aimed at the control and direction
of commerce and its instrumentalities, Justice Holmes has de-
fined the scope of their powers by reference to the point where the
commerce began and ended. Thus, where Kansas ordered inter-
state railroads to supply equal local switching service to shippers,
notwithstanding that the cars were eventually to enter interstate
cumnerce, he upheld the power on the ground that the cars had
not yet entered commerce.6 This was not the reasoning which the
majority of the court used in reaching the same result. Justice
Brewer, writing for them, said that in the absence of Congressional
action, a state could regulate matters which indirectly affected
4Pedersen v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Westerir R. R. Co., (1913) 229
U. S. 146, 33 S. Ct. 648, 57 L. Ed. 1125.
a(1943) 319 U. S. 491, 63 S. Ct. 1248, 87 L. Ed. 1538. In Federal Base-
ball Club of Baltimore v. National League, (1922) 259 U. S. 200, 42 S. Ct.
465, 66 L. Ed. 898, Justice Holmes held professional baseball as organized
not to constitute interstate commerce since the playing of the game was not
commerce and the interstate travel was merely incidental to it.
"Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., (1909) 211 U. S.
612, 29 S. Ct. 214, 53 L. Ed. 352. This principle was also applied in Termi-
nal Railroad Association v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, (1943) 318
U. S. 1, 63 S. Ct. 420, 87 L. Ed. 571, holding that a state could regulate
type of caboose to be used in absence of federal rule thereon.
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interstate commerce. The test applied in United States v. Wabash
Railroad Co. in 1944 to determine whether the spotting of freight
cars at the doors of factories was within the Interstate Commerce
Act was that which Justice Holmes had indicated, namely, whether
the cars were in or out of interstate commerce at the moment in-
volved. 7 Where, however, Congress had entered the field by legis-
lation its action became the exclusive law and over-rode any state
statute. Thus, where a trunk was lost by an interstate carrier a
limitation in the bill of lading, approved by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, could not be impaired by a Louisiana statute
requiring the carrier to affirmatively prove accident or uncon-
trollable events." A state public service commission could not de-
termine under a state statute the equipment of the rear car of a
train in interstate commerce where the Safety Appliance Act and
Interstate Commerce Act required a different type." But after
termination of transit the states might exercise their power with-
out any federal restraint. In cases where the goods have come
to rest, Justice Holmes stands on that point alone and as sufficient
without invoking the support of any police power doctrine.' 0
This accords with his holding in the Kansas freight car case that
there is a point where interstate commerce begins; this was the
corallary, namely, it also- had an end."
7(1944) 321 U. S. 403, 64 S. Ct. 752, 88 L. Ed. 827. In Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, (1923) 262 U. S. 553, 43 S. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed. 1117, Justice
Holmes based his dissent on the ground that the West Virginia statute limit-
ing the export of natural gas reached that commodity before it had begun
to move in interstate commerce, and was accordingly valid.
SAmerican Ry. Express Co. v. Levee, (1923) 263 U. S. 19, 44 S. Ct. 11,
68 L. Ed. 140.9Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, (1919) 250
U. S. 566, 40 S. Ct. 36, 64 L. Ed. 1142. See also Southern Ry. Co. v. Burling-
ton Lumber Co., (1912) 225 U. S. 99, 32 S. Ct. 657, 56 L. Ed. 1001, wherein
Justice Holmes held a state statute penalizing refusal to receive goods for
interstate shipment invalid; Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. Co. v.
-Yarneville Furniture Co., (1915) 237 U. S. 597, 35 S. Ct. 715, 59 L. Ed.
1137, in which he' held the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Com-
merce Act making the initial carrier liable on through shipments rendered
inoperative a South Carolina statute imposing penalties for failure of the
terminal carrier to pay damages for injury to interstate shipments in such
case except on proof of certain facts.
"°Weigle v. Curtice Bros. Co.. (1919) 248 U. S. 285, 39 S. Ct. 124, 63
L. Ed. 242, holding state law could apply to local sales not in original pack-
age of goods complying with Federal Pure Food Act which had been
shipped into the state. See also Hebe Co. v. Shaw, (1919) 248 U. S. 297.
39 S. Ct. 125, 63 L. Ed. 255. For a late discussion of this principle see
United States v. Carolene Products Co., (1938) 304 U. S. 144. 58 S. Ct.
778, 82 L. Ed. 1234.
"There are cases where an article of commerce becomes fused in a
mass which is a stream of interstate commerce. There Justice Holmes re-
fused to draw any distinction because unless the mass were treated as inter-
state commerce the federal power would be nullified; Eureka Pipe Line Co.
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In determining the powers of the states to exercise a licensing
power over those coming into their jurisdictions to transact local
business, Justice Holmes drew the line by a realistic consideration
of the facts to disclose whether there was any interference with
the federal commerce power. In Railway Express Co. v. Virginia,12
he held that the State Corporation Commission could deny the
company a permit to do intrastate business unless the company
qualified as a foreign corporation. This reasoning was followed
in 1944 in Union Brokerage Company v. Jensen"3 where Minne-
sota denied access to its courts by a foreign corporation for failure
to qualify as a foreign corporation and which -was held valid even
where the petitioner was transacting business as a custom house
broker under a federal license. It was pointed out in both cases
that the states have a right to protect their special interests in so
far as intrastate commerce is concerned. The ground of the de-
cision only becomes clear by consideration of other cases in which
he wrote or concurred. In Sioux Remedy Company v. Cope1 4
and Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant1 5 the right to require quali-
fication as a foreign corporation where interstate business was in-
volved was denied. The former involved an action to recover the
price of merchandise shipped from Iowa to South Dakota; the
latter an action for breach of a contract made by the defendant
in Kentucky, where suit was brought, and covering goods to be
shipped to plaintiff's mill in Tennessee. He held here, as in other
branches of this subject, that the burden on interstate commerce
resulting from the license requirement must be direct and the
fact that it affected commerce to some degree was not enough.
He dissented from the Court's holding that license taxes imposed
on the business of an interstate steamship agency directly affected
interstate commerce. 13 In these cases the party .resisting the li-
v. Hallanan, (1921) 257 U. S. 265, 42 S. Ct. 101, 66 L. Ed. 227, holding
a per barrel tax on oil passing through a state and partly drawn from a
gathering system within the state invalid; State Tax Commission of Missis-
sippi v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., Inc., (1931) 284 U. S. 41, 52 S. Ct.
62, 76 L. Ed. 156, in which gas run by pipe line from Louisiana gas field to
Mississippi and back to Louisiana and sold in 'Mississippi was held not
taxable by Mississippi.
'L(1931) 282 U. S. 440, 51 S. Ct. 201, 75 L. Ed. 450.
':(1944) 322 U. S. 202, 64 S. Ct. 967, 88 L. Ed. 1227.
11(1914) 235 U. S. 197, 35 S. Ct. 57, 59 L. Ed. 193.
1-(1921) 257 U. S. 282, 42 S. Ct. 106, 66 L. Ed. 239. But see Watters v.
Michigan, (1918) 248 U. S. 65, 39 S. Ct. 29, 63 L. Ed. 129, in which he sus-
tained the licensing requirement of a fichigan statute as applied to the sale
of goods that had come to rest in the state although the principal activity of
the salesmen was that of making sales in interstate commerce.
11 Texas Transport & Terminal Co. v. New Orleans, (1924) 264 U. S.
150, 44 S. Ct. 242, 68 L. Ed. 611; Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, (1927) 273
U. S. 34, 47 S. Ct. 267, 71 L. Ed. 524.
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censing power of the state was an independent contractor. He,
however, did not choose to stand on that, but, on the fact that
there was no restraint of commerce. In California v. Thompson,"
in 1941, an agent engaged in California in the selling of trans-
portation by motor vehicles to interstate points over the highways
of the state was held to be subject to a state license, issued after
a determination of fitness, and thus his dissenting views in the
earlier cases became the law of the Court.
The same general approach was followed by him in dealing
with other forms of exercises by the states of their police power.
This necessarily left a wide field in which these powers could
validly touch commerce, but without restraining it in an invalid
manner. The boundary of this field was determined by the in-
tention and the result of the state legislation. A Georgia statute
required a post to be set 400 feet from a grade crossing and the
engineer to continually check the speed of the train in the inter-
vening space so as to be ready to stop. Holmes dissented from the
judgment sustaining its validity. He construed the allegation of
the pleading to mean that there were numerous crossings which
created delay and thus the statute impeded commerce itself.1 8 An
order of a State Commission fixing the time of the departure of
trains and allowance of time at junctions was held invalid when
applied to interstate trains because it unduly interfered with inter-
state commerce.' 9 An order of a drainage district that certain
highway bridges used by interstate railway carriers be raised above
their existing level to avoid floods was held invalid because it
reached to lines of commerce which were exclusively under the
control of Congress .2  But a Memphis ordinance which required
a flagman at a crossing fell in a different category. It did not
interfere with commerce and was merely related to it. So the
Court could not say, against the judgment of the City Council,
that an electric blinker was sufficient. 21 On this side of the line
also fell a Texas statute requiring four trains a day, excluding
Sundays, to stop at each county seat. This is a close case. The
state's hand is laid on the movement of commerce. The resulting
17(1941) 313 U. S. 109, 61 S. Ct. 930, 85 L. Ed. 1219.
"sSouthern Ry. Co. v. King, (1910) 217 U. S. 524, 30 S. Ct. 594, 54
L. Ed. 868.
19Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. of Texas v. Texas, (1918) 245
U. S. 484, 38 S. Ct. 178, 62 L. Ed. 419.
-OKansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage District,
(1914) 233 U. S. 75, 34 S. Ct. 564, 58 L. Ed. 857.
2Nashville, Chatanooga & St. L. Ry. Co. v. White, (1929) 278 U. S.
456, 49 S. Ct. 189, 73 L. Ed. 452.
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delay was considered and found to be slight, and the decisive
point was made that the clear objective was to favor county seats
rather than to interfere with commerce. 22 This dividing line is
reflected in the decisions after Holmes' tenure. A California statute
regulating the canning and curing of fish taken on the high seas
for shipment in interstate commerce was held valid as not in-
volving a purpose to interfere with interstate commerce. "It in
no way limits or regulates or attempts to limit or regulate the
movement of the sardines from outside into the state, or the move-
ment of the manufactured product from the state to the outside. '23
In Duckworth v. Arkansas,24 decided in 1941, Arkansas was held
entitled to require a permit, obtainable upon application for a
nominal fee, from those who were transporting intoxicating liquor
through the state. It was a means of establishing identity, the
route and point of destination, which enabled local officials to in-
sure transport without diversion. Beyond that it did not retard
the free flow of commerce.
In considering the powers of the states respecting the taxa-
tion of interstate commerce, it is necessary to put to one side
those cases which deal with discrimination in taxes levied by the
states and those which are concerned with taxation of property
beyond a state's borders. These latter involve the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The matter presently at hand con-
cerns the commerce clause-the exclusive power of Congress to
regulate commerce among the states under Art. I, sec. 8.
The field of law which we thus reach was to be controlled by
concepts of Justice Holmes. He summarized the law as it was to
develop and he made a prophesy as to the difficulties to arise which
was fulfilled. justice Holmes, as a lawyer, was a realist. His age
was the pragmatic age and he applied that idea with a will. He
could, therefore, easily see that in a field where ideas of a general
nature would create difficulty in their application to facts, some
might be led to believe that only chaos and confusion were left.
In Szoift and Conlpany v. United States,25 in repelling the argu-
ment that the cattle were not in the stream of commerce while in
the stockyards, he said that they had not come to rest to an extent
that they were subject to taxation. Then he added this sentence,
"Gulf, Colorado & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. Texas, (1918) 246 U. S. 58,
38 S. Ct. 236, 62 L. Ed. 574.23Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, (1936) 297 U. S. 422, 56 S. Ct. 513,
80 L. Ed. 772.
24(1941) 314 U. S. 390, 62 S. Ct. 311, 86 L. Ed. 294.27(1905) 196 U. S. 375, 25 S. Ct. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518.
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"But it may be that the question of taxation does not depend upon
whether the article taxed may or may not be said to be in the
course of commerce between the states, but depends upon whether
the tax so far affects that commerce as to amount to a regulation
of it." Two years later in Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio
Railway Company v. Texas26 the Court was dealing with a Texas
statute which levied a tax of one per centum on the gross receipts
of a railway, the lines of which were entirely within the state but
the gross receipts from which included those derived from the car-
riage of passengers and freight coming from or destined to
points without the state. Justice Holmes, in holding the statute
invalid, pointed out that since not every law affecting interstate
commerce is a regulation of it in the constitutional sense, nice
distinctions were to be expected; and that, while the state must
be allowed to tax the property at its actual value as a going con-
cern, it could not tax interstate business. These principles, he
pointed out, did not admit of logical reconciliation, yet, attempts
2,(1908) 210 U. S. 217, 225, 227, 28 S. Ct. 638, 52 L. Ed. 1031. The
same rule was applied in Meyer v. Wells, Fargo & Co., (1912) 223 U. S.
298, 32 S. Ct. 218, 56 L. Ed. 445, (tax on proportional income on gross
basis and including income from investment and lands outside the state);
also in Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, (1918) 248
U. S. 67, 39 S. Ct. 24, 63 L. Ed. 131, (authorization fee for issuance of
mortgage bonds by a railroad on entire line based on a percentage of total
issue held invalid). The rule of the Galveston Case was later applied by the
Court in Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Commission, (1937)
302 U. S. 90, 58 S. Ct. 72, 82 L. Ed. 68, (stevedoring of vessels engaged in
interstate commerce may not be taxed upon the basis of gross receipts by a
state) ; also in Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, (1939) 305 U. S.
434, 59 S. Ct. 325, 83 L. Ed. 272, (gross receipts tax on business of market-
ing and shipping fruit to other states invalid). The tax in either case went
to the exercise of the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. See
New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. v. State Board, (1929) 280 U. S. 338, 50
S. Ct. 111, 74 L. Ed. 463, which applies the rule of the Galveston Case and
in which Holmes' dissent is based on the point that the stringing of wires
was a right which could be had only by New Jersey's consent-a privilege
which must be paid for. "Even interstate commerce must pay its way." On
the point that a state may charge a privilege tax for doing intrastate busi-
ness see Pullman Co. v. Adams, (1903) 189 U. S. 420, 23 S. Ct. 494. 47
L. Ed. 877, (based on miles of track over which cars were operated within
the state). Holmes insisted on the point that since a state could exclude a
foreign corporation from intrastate business it could fix the terms upon
which it could enter the state, including the imposition of the tax. This, he
said, applied even where the condition was imposed after entry into the
state and in the absence of contract. See his dissents in Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, (1910) 216 U. S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 190, 54 L. Ed. 355;
and Pullman Co. v. Kansas, (1910) 216 U. S. 56, 30 S. Ct. 232, 54 L. Ed.
378. In Burrill v. Locomobile Co., (1912) 258 U. S. 34, 42 S. Ct. 256, 66
L. Ed. 450, Justice Holmes, writing for the entire Court, held that Massa-
chusetts could make proceedings by a foreign corporation to recover taxes
paid to the state, exclusive in the state court. The reasoning is that a foreign
corporation was subject to the law of the state. A suit brought in the
Federal Court was dismissed.
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to value property were sensibly different from taxes aimed at in-
terstate business and a practical line could be drawn by taking the
whole scheme of taxation into account. This must be done as
best the Court could, keeping in mind that giving the tax a particu-
lar name could never take away the Court's duty to consider the
nature of the tax and its effect.
In Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky,27 the state levied a sales
tax on gasoline and defined "sale" so as to include a purchase
without the state for sales distribution or use within the state. It
was resisted by an interstate ferry operator who purchased his
gasoline across the river in Illinois. Justice Holmes concurred
in the decision striking the statute down in view of its having
reached to a product which was used at least to 75% in interstate
commerce in the operation of the ferry. Also, the sale was outside
the state, a point not under consideration with us at this moment.
But he also joined in the concurring opinion which declined to
place the decision on the point that it was beyond the state's
power to place a tax on the use of a medium of interstate com-
merce-here gasoline-and which reiterated the test that the tax
to be invalid must be aimed at or discriminate against interstate
commerce.
The application of the rule which was stated in passing in
Swift and Company v. United States has been made in several
recent cases in the Supreme Court. Thus, in McGoldrick v. Ber-
woind-White Co., 28 the New York City sales tax was enforced as
to coal produced in Pennsylvania and shipped to a purchaser in
New York City. The New York sales tax was of general applica-
tion and the burden of it fell upon the buyer. The sale had been
negotiated in New York City by the vendor's local representative,
and the coal was also delivered there. The fact that the seller was
compelled to collect the tax, and made liable for it if he did not
collect it, was a mere dramatic incident. The application for the
refund was by the seller who had been compelled to pay under the
duty imposed by the ordinance. This subject matter becomes
blurred at a certain point by the obscurity under the commerce
power as to a state's right to tax property to which it affords pro-
tection; such power to tax exists where the forbidden restraint
on commerce is not present. But a state cannot go beyond its
jurisdictional lines. Thus, it was held at the 1943 Term that where
"7(1929) 279 U. S. 245, 49 S. Ct. 279, 73 L. Ed. 683.
'-'(1940) 309 U. S. 33, 60 S. Ct. 388, 84 L. Ed. 565. The same rule was
applied in McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., (1940) 309 U. S. 70,
60 S. Ct. 404, 84 L. Ed. 584.
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the sale is completed and title passes in the state of shipment,
there is no sale to which a sales tax in the state of receipt of the
goods can apply. 29 The last case, though discussed under the com-
merce clause, does not belong there. The second state cannot reach
1y a sales tax a sale in another state (a completed sale is postu-
lated by the facts) since the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits that. The political device by which this
jurisdictional bridge is gapped is the use tax. There the state's
taxing jurisdiction is reestablished. The states may tax the use of
property as well as the sale of property. The issue which arises
under a use tax is as before, namely, whether there is an inter-
ference with the federal power over commerce. Whether the use
tax was suggested by the concurring opinion in Helson and Ran-
dolph v. Kentucky is of consequence no further than to note that
the cases which" sustained the use tax, where it does not interfere
with interstate commerce, were later. They extend from Mona-
motor Oil Co. v. Johnson,"0 in 1934, and Henneford v. Silas
Mason Co.,31 in 1937, where the tax was sustained, through Felt
and Tarrant Co. v. Gallagher,3 2 where the attack on the statute
was based on the mere incident that the vendor was made the
state's collection agent, a contention again made and repelled in
General Trading Co. v. Iowa3 at the 1943 Term where the vendor
used travelling salesmen going from Minnesota to Iowa. The
tax was on the user and the vendor was merely the collection
agent. The fact that the vendor had no place of business in the
state was held to make no difference and did not distinguish the
Gallagher Case. The test was interference with interstate com-
merce and compelling the collection of a local tax was held under
the circumstances not enough to deter such commerce.
International Harvester Company v. Department of Treasury
of the State of Indiana,34 decided at the 1943 Term, when analyzed,
applies rather than departs from the principles justice Holmes
had established. The statute had been characterized as "a priv-
ilege tax on the receipt of gross income." 85 It reached gross in-
29McLeod v. T. E. Dilworth Co., (1944) 322 U. S. 327, 349, 64 S. Ct.
1023, 1030, 88 L. Ed. 1304, 1319.
30(1934) 292 U. S. 86, 54 S. Ct. 575, 78 L. Ed. 1141.
31(1937) 300 U. S. 577, 57 S. Ct. 524. 81 L. Ed. 814.
32(1939) 306 U. S. 62, 59 S. Ct. 376, 83 L. Ed. 488.
-3(1944) 322 U. S. 335, 349, 64 S. Ct. 1028, 1030, 88 L. Ed. 1309, 1319.
34(1944) 322 U. S. 340, 64 S. Ct. 1019, 1030, 88 L. Ed. 1313.
35Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, (1938) 304 U. S. 307, 58 S. Ct. 913, 82
L. Ed. 1365.
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come and in the series of transactions before the Court some man-
ufacturing had been done outside the state of goods for shipment
across state lines.:" All of the deliveries had been made, however,
in Indiana. The statute had already been sustained by the Supreme
Court in so far as it operated as a sales tax.37 The statute itself
declared that it did not reach to any gross income from commerce
between the states and went on to state that it reached only to
"gross income from sources within this State." It had been so
interpreted by the state court which excluded from its provisions
orders accepted outside the confines of the state where payment
was made to branches outside the state.38 The Supreme Court,
looking beyond the names to the intent, followed its prior de-
cision in the Wood Corporation Case as to the sale made and
completed in Indiana by branches outside the state. The sales
made by branches in Indiana to purchasers outside the state and
completed by delivery in Indiana were held subject to a sales tax
under principles of McGoldrick v. Berwind-WVhite Co. The Court
then went on to treat the statute as a use tax respecting those
sales made in Indiana and completed by shipment from without
the state. There is nothing in the opinion which indicates that the
Court intended to over-rule the decision written by Justice Holmes
in Galveston H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Texas. Since the Court trans-
posed the so-called gross receipts tax to a sales and use tax, in
order to bring it within the state's proper orbit, it can hardly be
OThe several classes of sales involved are described by the Court in
322 U. S. 340 at page 342, as follows:
"Class C: Sales by branches located outside Indiana to dealers
and users residing in Indiana. The orders were solicited in Indiana
and the customers took delivery to themselves at the factories in
Indiana to save time and expense of shipping.
"Class D: Sales by branches located in Indiana to dealers and users
residing outside of Indiana, in which the customers came to Indiana
and accepted delivery to themselves in this state.
"Class E: Sales by branches located in Indiana to dealers and users
residing in Indiana. in which the goods were shipped from points
outside Indiana to customers in Indiana, pursuant to contracts so
providing."
"7Dep't of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp'n, (1941) 313 U. S. 62,
61 S. Ct. 885, 85 L. Ed. 1188.55Dep't of Treasury v. International Harvester Co., (1943) 221 Ind. 416,
47 N. E. (2d) 150. In Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, (1944 C.C.A.
7) 141 Fed. (2d) 24, the Indiana gross income tax was sustained as ap-
plied to the receipts from the sale of automobiles transported into Indiana
where delivery was made to dealers and payment received. Certiorari has
been granted. In Hewit v. Freeman, (1943 Ind. Sup. Ct.) 51 N. E. (2d) 6,
the tax was sustained as applied to the proceeds of sales of stock made by a
resident owner through a New York broker. The case is now before the
United States Supreme Court.
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said to have authorized a gross receipts tax which in any way
restrained interstate commerce. 9
Justice Holmes' view as to the extent of the power conferred
upon Congress by the federal commerce power is illustrated by
some of his opinions written for the Court, and one dissent. In
the case involving- the Webb-Kiny6n Act he sustained the view
that Congress could prohibit the use of the channels of interstate
commerce to circumvent state laws prohibiting the manufacture
and sale of intoxicants within such state.40  His dissent in Ham-
mer v. Dagenhart4' carried the views on the extent of Congress'
power to give its regulations the form of prohibitions to their
logical conclusion. He had no difficulty in holding that the fed-
eral statute excluding from interstate commerce the goods pro-
duced in factories employing child labor a valid regulation of
interstate commerce since the regulation operated immediately in
the field of interstate commerce. His minority view became the
law of the land when in 1941 the Supreme Court sustained the pro-
vision of the Fair Labor Standards Act prohibiting the interstate
shipment of goods produced under substandard labor conditions as
defined by Congress.42
The opinions of Justice Holmes involving the Interstate Com-
merce Act relate mainly to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission under the statute and its powers in matters of
procedure. In fixing the jurisdiction of the Commission, he has
leaned twoards a strict construction of the statute where it was
in derogation of the common law. His decisions in this field are
too numerous to warrant full discussion. They are listed in a
footnote.43
39In considering the text the reader may wish to compare the course
which the Supreme Court followed in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. Nfc-
Loughlin, (1944) 65 S. Ct. 152. There the case was remanded to the Dis-
trict Court in order that the Connecticut Courts might construe the state
statute and mark out exactly what aspect of the interstate business the state
desired to tax. Comparison should also be made with Commissioner v.
Ford Motor Co., (1941) 308 Mass. 558, 33 N. E. (2d) 318, wherein it was
held gross proceeds of interstate commerce must be apportioned.
40Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. R. Co., (1917) 242 U. S. 311,
37 S. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326.41(1918) 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. 1101.
42U. S. v. Darby Lumber Co., (1941) 312 U. S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451. 85
L. Ed. 609. '43Jurisdiction of the Commission :-Central Stock Yards Co. v. Louis-
ville and Nashville Railroad Co., (1904) 192 U. S. 568, 24 S. Ct. 339, 48
L. Ed. 565, (See. 3 requiring facilities for the interchange of traffic relates
to track connections and does not require different appliances for the un-
loading of cattle than those established or the turning over of cars to another
carrier); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware Lackawanna &
Western Railway Co., (1910) 216 U. S. 531, 30 S. Ct. 415, 54 L. Ed. 605,
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Due Process and Equal Protection
The principal matters to be considered here involve taxation
in two aspects, namely, discrimination and the taking of property
without due process which has been defined to include the at-
tempts of the states to tax property beyond their jurisdiction. 4
The subject of taxation does not exhaust all of Justice Holmes'
work in this field of law and only some aspects and applications
of the constitutional rules can be considered here. Others can best
be discussed under the definite branches of the law out of which
they arose.
The basic idea underlying the provision regarding equal pro-
tection of the laws is the avoidance of unjust discrimination. In
the complexities of modem life, classification is not only neces-
sary but constitutionally permissible. The problem, therefore, is
to determine what classifications are admissible before the point
(the remedy of requiring the establishment of switching connections with a
lateral branch line may be exercised by shippers only and it is not open to
a railway claiming to be a lateral line) ; Interstate Commerce Commission
v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., (1910) 216 U. S. 538, 30 S. Ct. 417, 54
L. Ed. 608. (Establishment of through routes is conditioned by statute on
factor that "no reasonable or satisfactory through route exists") ; Ellis v.
Interstate Commerce Commission, (1915) 237 U. S. 434, 35 S. Ct. 645, 59
L. Ed. 1036. (One leasing refrigerator cars is not a carrier within the statute;
it might be examined as to relations with a carrier but not as to manu-
facture, ownership or repair of cars, or profit, loss, investment or cost of
.service) ; Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. United States, (1916) 242
U. S. 60, 37 S. Ct. 61, 61 L. Ed. 152. (Two carriers which by joint action
had established a common terminal need not share the facilities with a
third carrier in view of reservation in the statute; need not give use of their
facilities to another engaged in like business.)
Discrimination-Rebates.-Interstate Commerce Commission v. Diffen-
baugh, (1911) 222 U. S. 42, 32 S. Ct. 22, 56 L. Ed. 83. (Reasonable payments
to elevators of grain belonging to elevator owner are valid even though
owners perform other services which are to their own advantage such as
cleaning and mixing.)
Procedure.-Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1908) 211
U. S. 407, 29 S. Ct. 115, 53 L. Ed. 253. (Examination of Harriman and
Kuhn limited to matters which might be the subject of a complaint under the
statute and general investigative power denied.)
Powers.-United States v. Chicago Milwaukee St. Paul and Pacific
Railroad Company, (1931) 282 U. S. 311, 51 S. Ct. 159, 75 L. Ed. 359.
(Commission's control over funds raised for reorganization expenses denied
by majority; Holmes joined in dissent) ; United States v. Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co., (1931) 284 U. S. 195, 52 S. Ct. 109, 76 L. Ed. 243. (May
not make an order retroactive to date of the complaint under Section 15 (2)
which provides orders shall take effect in reasonable time not exceeding 30
days. Holmes dissented) ; Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Railway Co., (1932) 284 U. S. 370, 52 S. Ct. 183, 76 L. Ed. 348. (Rate
being fixed, moneys received under it may not be subject to reparation order
upon the rate being later revised downwards and the first action found un-
warranted. Holmes dissented.)
4"See discussion in Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, (1905)
199 U. S. 194, 26 S. Ct. 36, 50 L. Ed. 150.
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of invalid discrimination has been reached and passed. Justice
Holmes was inclined to go into the facts and form his judgment
there rather than proceed upon any general principle. A state
income tax applicable to corporations doing business both within
and without the state, but exempting corporations doing business
entirely within the state was found by the majority of the Court to
discriminate unreasonably. He dissented, saying that it was a
reasonable classification.45 In taxation matters he went on the
footing that in so far as assessments were concerned, only those
cases which raised an issue as to inequality in the method of
assessment fell within the scope of the equal protection clause."6
Exemptions did not necessarily raise the issue.4 7 Differences in
judgment are not enough.48
On the issues relating to classification allowable within the
equal protection clause Justice Holmes, writing for the majority
in Kidd v. Alabama45 said that. a large degree of latitude is allowed
to the states for classification upon a reasonable basis. So it might
tax the stock of a foreign railway company without levying a
tax upon the stock of domestic railways or foreign railways doing
business in the state. The taxes on the property and franchises
of the latter might impose a proportionate burden. Following this
line of thought he dissented in Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Gaston,50 where the majority held that an annual franchise tax
imposed on a foreign corporation after it had entered the state
violated the equal protection clause where no like tax was imposed
on domestic corporations. It is very probable that the point of the
dissent, which is without opinion, went on the theory that since
the state could exclude a foreign corporation, it might impose
terms which are set out fully in his dissenting opinions in the
Western Union Telegraph Co.-1 and Pullman Company Cases -
decided at the same term. In Quaker City Cab Company v. Co;i-
45Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, (1920) 253 U. S. 412, 40 S. Ct. 560,
64 L. Ed. 989.46Wilson v. Illinois Southern Ry. Co., (1924) 263 U. S. 574, 44 S. Ct.
203, 68 L. Ed. 456.
4Missouri v. Dockery, (1903) 191 U. S. 165, 24 S. Ct. 53, 48 L. Ed.
133; Kidd v. Alabama, (1903) 188 U. S. 730, 23 S. Ct. 401, 47 L. Ed. 669.48Coulter v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., (1905) 196 U. S. 599, 25
S. Ct. 342, 49 L. Ed. 615.
-9(1903) 188 U. S. 730, 23 S. Ct. 401, 47 L. Ed. 669.
50(1910) 216 U. S. 418, 30 S. Ct. 291, 54 L. Ed. 542.
31Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, (1910) 216 U. S. 1, 30
S. Ct. 190, 54 L. Ed. 355.
3 52Pullman Co. v. Kansas, (1910) 216 U. S. 56, 30 St. Ct. 232, 54 L. Ed.378.
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;nonwealthr the majority of the Court were of the opinion that
a Pennsylvania statute which levied a gross receipts tax on cor-
porations, both domestic and foreign, which engaged in the opera-
tion of taxicabs in intrastate business and did not levy a like tax
on individuals and partnerships was invalid. Again he dissented,
saying the matter was one of degree; the larger might be taxed
and the smaller disregarded. He added the further reason that,
if the legislature saw fit to discourage such business in corporate
form, it could legally do so. In a suit by a corporation which
owned stock in two other corporations which paid full taxes it
was claimed that the levy was discriminatory because individuals
were not taxed for such stock and that the tax was double. He
held, writing for the Court, that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not prevent double taxation any more than doubling the tax and
that the legislature could make the distinction involved between
corporations and individuals. 54
At this point we make a sharp turn and pass to the matters
justice Holmes dealt with under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The tax cases alone need be considered in
order to show clearly the parallelism and diversities from the
equal protection clause of the Amendment. The constitutional in-
junction is that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law. We are concerned with the last
element, property.15 When Justice Holmes came to the Court,
the rule was already established that the attempt of a state to tax
property beyond its borders or control had no warrant in law
and was a denial of due process. The application of this principle
of law went through an important development while he sat in
the Court. The application of the principle in its extension to in-
tangible property created many difficulties. The issue turned on
whether the property was within the state's control. The matter
so far as it dealt with entities which could be physically placed
and identified was easy since geographical position had only to
53,(1928) 277 U. S. 389, 48 S. Ct. 553, 72 L. Ed. 927. In Quong Wing v.
Kirkendall, (1912) 223 U. S. 59, 32 S. Ct. 192, 56 L. Ed. 350, Justice Holmes,
writing for the majority, sustained the exemption of steam laundries, and
women engaged in the laundry business if not more than two were so en-
gaged, from a license tax upon persons engaged in the laundry business. He
reasoned, as he did in the case cited in the text, that the state may favor cer-
tain industries and that the equal protection clause did not create a fictitious
equality where a real difference existed.
5'Fort Smith Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, (1920) 251 U. S. 532, 40 S. Ct.
304, 64 L. Ed. 396.
r-'A similar provision of the Fifth Amendment applies to the federal
government.
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be determined. But the conception of property as relating to
physical objects did not cover the entire field of commercial activ-
ity or exhaust its possibilities. Property is more than possession;
it includes rights which verge into the intangible. The commercial
world was moving into an era in which rights were becoming
more intangible. Situs could clarify matters where property was
a physical object. It could not serve as a guide, however, where
the physical had changed into the intangible. Under the dis-
crimination clause lines must be drawn to separate legitimate classi-
fication from the arbitrary; under the due process clause the
silken threads must be traced out by which those rights are de-
termined which go to make up property and its protection.
A state may tax property within its borders. A domestic cor-
poration may, however, be doing an interstate business. To what
degree must its physical property be within the state lines in order
to be taxed? In New York ex rel. New York Central and Hudson
River Railroad Company v. Miller,56 Justice Holmes held that,
while property outside the state could not be taxed, the domicil-
iary state might treat as property within it that which was some-
times during the taxable year in the state, and sometimes without
its borders. Thus, it was not enough for a railway company to
show that a part of its rolling stock was temporarily outside of the
state during a part of the taxable year. The decision draws a prac-
tical jurisdictional line. The decision was followed at the 1943
Term in the case of aeroplanes engaged in interstate business and
having their home base in Minnesota.57 Other cases which involved
property in the physical sense may be rapidly summarized. In Fargo
v. Hart5" it was held that an assessment may take into considera-
tion the value of the property as a going concern, but that Indiana
could not include the value of securities and real estate in New York
not employed in the same class of business carried on in Indiana.
Wallace v. Hines59 decided that North Dakota could not compute
a tax by apportioning the total value of stocks and bonds of the
taxpayer on the basis of mileage within and without the state
since the cost of construction was greater in mountainous sec-
tions and large termini were without the state. In Atchison, To-
peka & Santa Fe Railway Company v. O'Connor0 Colorado was
56(1906) 202 U. S. 584, 26 S. Ct. 714, 50 L. Ed. 1155.
57Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, (1944) 322 U. S. 292, 64 S. Ct. 950,
88 L. Ed. 1283.58(1904) 193 U. S. 490, 24 S. Ct. 498, 48 L. Ed. 761.
-9(1920) 253 U. S. 66, 40 S. Ct. 435, 64 L. Ed. 782.
Go(1912) 223 U. S. 280, 32 S. Ct. 216, 56 L. Ed. 436.
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denied the power to levy a tax of 2c on each $1,000 of a foreign
corporation's capital stock where the greater part of the property
represented thereby was outside of Colorado. Even the state's
right to admit a foreign corporation on terms could not save a
statute so obviously unconstitutional. In a somewhat similar case,
Meer v. IVells Farqo & Co." an Oklahoma franchise tax which
was in addition to an ad valorem property tax, based upon gross
receipts from every source but apportioned upon the basis of
business done within and without the state was held invalid where
the petitioner had investments in bonds and lands outside of
Oklahoma. W1e must add two dissents. In Maxwell v. Bugbee62
the majority sustained a New Jersey transfer tax statute ivhich
laid a tax on nonresident decedents in so far as they left real
estate or tangible personal property located in New Jersey, or
shares of stock in corporations organized under the laws of, or
national banks located in, New Jersey. The tax basis consisted of
the property that would have been taxable if the decedent had
died a resident of New Jersey, which would include intangibles
that that state could not reach directly in the case of nonresident
decedents. The amount of the tax was computed by applying to
the tax based thereon the ratio of taxable property within the
state to the-total included in the basis. This produced a larger
tax than would have been leviable had New Jersey limited its
basis to property within the state. Justice Holmes correctly said
that property outside of the state had been taken into account for
the purpose of increasing the tax on property within the state, and
held the tax invalid on that account. In Cudahy Packing Company
v. Hinkle'i" an annual license tax based upon authorized capital
stock but with a maximum limit of $3,000 was held by the ma-
jority to be invalid where the corporation did both inter and intra-
state business. justice Holmes joined in the dissent which took
the view that upon all of the facts the state had only exacted a
fair contribution to the necessary expenses of its government.
We must now cross to the more indefinite fields where prop-
erty is not a physical object which can be identified and placed
but rests in the intangible realm of rights. This may best be done
by taking the case of ATew Orleans Parish v. New York Life In-
surance Cornpany v., The taxpayer was a foreign corporation
domiciled outside Louisiana. The parish had laid a tax on credits
''(1912) 223 U. S. 298, 32 S. Ct. 218, 56 L. Ed. 445.
,2(1919) 250 U. S. 525, 40 S. Ct. 2, 63 L. Ed. 1124.
'(1929) 278 U. S. 460, 49 S. Ct. 204, 73 L. Ed. 454.
,,4 (1910) 216 U. S. 517, 30 S. Ct. 385, 54 L. Ed. 597.
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of $598,000 and deposits of $50,700. The evidence showed that
the deposits in local banks were made only for transmission to
New York and were not drawn against in Louisiana. The credits
consisted of loans upon policies of Louisiana residents. They were
represented by notes but in the event of default the note was can-
celled and a charge made against the reserve. Premium advances
fell in the same category. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court,
held the tax fell within the due process clause. There was no right
which required enforcement within the state; there was no right
which the state was protecting.
A similar issue arising in a different way was involved in Safe
Deposit and Trust Company of Baltimore v. Virginia.5 A resident
of Virginia had created a trust in Maryland for the benefit of
minor children and died without exercising a power of revocation.
Virginia laid a tax upon the corpus. The majority held the tax
invalid. Justice Stone's concurring opinion pointed out that Vir-
ginia's right to tax the equity was not involved. Holmes dissented
broadly, saying taxes are levied on persons and measured by
property but inability to protect might bring with it inability to
tax.
In the state laws taxing transfers by a decedent the theory
of domicil as giving situs to personal property was destined to
collide with the theory of property as dependent on the rights
and remedies which give property meaning. Justice Holmes' view
was that the rights and remedies were determinative of a state's
power to tax such transfers. This was for a time the prevailing
view, but was, during his time on the Court, to become the minority
view. After his passing, his views again became the law. The
final solution of the difficulties arising from multiple state taxa-
tion was reached through a suggestion which he made, namely.
that the states could dispose of the matter by an agreement
among themselves. In 1942, in State Tax Commission v. 4l-
drich,66 the court went back to the ideas of Blackstone v. Miller,6 7
and the view which Justice Holmes had stated there again became
the law of the land. In the Aldrich Case, it was held that Utah
could impose a transfer tax on shares of stock of a domestic cor-
poration belonging to a decedent resident in New York. The case
history of this development is as follows:
In Blackstone v. Miller, Justice Holmes, writing for the ma-
65(1929) 280 U. S. 83, 50 S. Ct. 59, 74 L. Ed. 180.
66(1942) 316 U. S. 174,.62 S. Ct. 1108, 86 L. Ed. 1358.
67(1902) 188 U. S. 189, 23 S. Ct. 277, 47 L. Ed. 439.
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jority, held that New York could tax an account receivable and
a desposit in a bank in New York City belonging to a resident of
Illinois because the law of the place made the debtor pay. In
Farmers Loan and Trust Company v. MinnesotaP8 the majority
held that bonds belonging to a resident of New York, issued by
the State of Minnesota and its municipalities, could not be taxed
by Minnesota. Justice Holmes wrote the dissenting opinion, say-
ing that the law of Minnesota was a present force necessary to
the existence of the obligation. In Baldwin v. Missouri" the
majority held that Missouri could not tax credits in a bank, coupon
bonds of the United States, nor notes secured on lands, all of
which were in Missouri, belonging to a resident of Illinois. Justice
Holmes wrote one of the dissents, saying that due process had
no application to the matter and pointed out that the result of
avoiding double taxation should be reached by uniform legislation
or an agreement among the states. In Beidler v. South Carolina
Tax Comwission'" the majority held that South Carolina could
not tax debts due from a domestic corporation to a resident of
Illinois. Justice Holmes concurred only because the prior de-
cisions had settled the law and he did not care to repeat the rea-
soning which had not prevailed. In First National Bank of Boston
v. Maine,1 the majority held that Maine could not tax the transfer
of shares of stock of a domestic corporation owned by a person
resident in Massachusetts. Holmes joined in the dissent which
also pointed out the necessity of reciprocal legislation. It was
this position that was over-ruled in the Aldrich Case.7 2
The taxation by states of property held in trust has involved
many different problems. The law in this field, so far as the
Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, is in line with the views
which Justice Holmes had stated in Blackstone v. Miller. In
1939, in Curry v. McCanless, 7 it was held that both Tennessee
and Alabama could each impose their death taxes on intangibles
held in trust by an Alabama trustee and passing under the will
of a person domiciled in Tennessee. At the same Term, in Graves
,1(1930) 280 U. S. 204, 50 S. Ct. 98, 74 L. Ed. 371.
-0,1930) 281 U. S. 586, 50 S. Ct. 436, 74 L. Ed. 1056.
,,(1930) 282 U. S. 1, 51 S. Ct. 54, 75 L. Ed. 131.
7'(1932) 284 U. S. 312, 52 S. Ct. 174, 76 L. Ed. 313.
*7The Convention bet-ween the United States and Canada for the avoid-
ance of double taxation and the prevention of tax evasion in the case of
death taxes, recently approved by the United States Senate, makes taxation
of the transfer of corporate shares depend on place of incorporation. See
Article III of the Treaty.
-;'(1939) 307 U. S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 900, 83 L. Ed. 1339.
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v. Elliott,74 a decedent domiciled in New York was held taxable
there on a revocable trust created in Colorado, while he was
domiciled there, which had become effective at death by his failure
to exercise the povver to revoke.
The point respecting protection as a basis of taxation appears
in a different line. of cases which also mark off some of the
limitations of the rule. Justice Holmes, writing for the entire
Court, held that Pennsylvania might, in computing a premium tax
on insurance business done within the state, include premiums
paid outside the state by rdsidents of the state since the state
rendered certain benefits to policyholders in protecting their lives
and the incidents of the business, such as the payment of premiums
and the sending of adjusters into the state.75 Ohio has been held
entitled to levy a tax upon a South Carolina insurance corporation
which made a blanket contract in Michigan to insure automobiles
whenever and wherever sold in so far as a sale was carried out
and such insurance perfected in Ohio by reason of the original
contract and that, for that purpose, Ohio could make the party
procuring the application in Ohio the agent of the insurance com-
pany. 7  The original contract was beyond the reach of Ohio but
the act of purchasing a car made it effective there for taxation
purposes. But where an Arkansas statute levied a 5% tax (de-
scribed as an "occupation tax") upon a Missouri corporation
authorized to do business in Arkansas, on premiums paid to
foreign insurance companies, not authorized to do business in
74(1939) 307 U. S. 383, 59 S. Ct. 913, 83 L. Ed. 1356.
73Equitable Life Assurance Society of The United States v. Pennsyl-
vania, (1915) 238 U. S. 143, 35 S. Ct. 839, 59 L. Ed. 1239. See also justice
Holmes dissenting opinion in Compania De Tebacos v. Collector, (1927)
275 U. S. 87, 48 S. Ct. 100, 72 L. Ed. 177. There the majority held that the
government of the Philippine Islands could not exact an excise tax from
a person having goods there, on the basis insurance written on those goods
by its home office at Barcelona by insurers in Paris and London. justice
Holmes said an essential act was done in the Philippines in shipping the
goods which were the subject of the insurance and at any rate the Philip-
pines were protecting the goods at the moment the tax accrued.
The theory of protection as a basis for taxation, which underlies the
decisions in International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Department of Taxa-
tion, (1944) 322 U. S. 435, 64 S. Ct. 1060, 88 L. Ed. 1373, and its antecedent
Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., (1940) 311 U. S. 435, 61 S. Ct. 246. 85
L. Ed. 267, finds its source in the cases last cited. These cases sustained the
power of Wisconsin to tax the privilege of declaring and receiving dividends
from income earned within it. as applied to foreign corporations, and which
made the corporation responsible for the collection of the tax. It was held
that the declaration of the dividend outside the state did not prevent the levy
of the tax.76 Palmetto Fire Insurance Co. v. Conn, (1926) 272 U. S. 295, 47 S. Ct.
-88, 71 L. Ed. 243. The case also decided cases involving Maine and Wis-
consin statutes.
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Arkansas, justice Holmes, on finding that the contract was made
in Missouri, went behind the characterization of the tax and de-
clared it invalid because Arkansas could not regulate what went
on outside.77 This principle of law was applied and amplified
in Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson.7 1 There
a Connecticut corporation which had been long since licensed as
a foreign corporation in California, in addition to the insurance
business done in California, also wrote, by contracts made in
Connecticut where the premiums Nvere paid and losses settled,
reinsurance of companies doing business in California. It was
held that these reinsurance premiums could not be included for
the purpose of computing the tax for the privilege of doing busi-
ness in the State. As in the St. Louis Cotton Press Company
Case, these contracts were beyond the state's reach. The right of
the state to tack the obligation on as a condition of entry was
barred because the Connecticut company, having been admitted
in California, was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in the
property right of admission. These cases also follow from Justice
Holmes' decision in Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya.70 There
New Mexico asserted the right to cancel a foreign insurance com-
pany's right to do business if any commissions were paid to a non-
resident agent for business written in the state. This, under the
business practice, reached to terms of employment and the pay-
ment of agents outside the state. Justice Holmes struck it down
on the ground the state could not reach outside its borders. He
rejected the point that such could be made a condition of the ad-
mission of the company as a foreign corporation, saying that it
would, under the circumstances, amount to the use of a right to
accomplish a forbidden result.
The preceding discussion has been concerned almost wholly
with cases involving taxation. The same realistic approach char-
acterizes justice Holmes' decisions in other fields in which the
issues were drawn in terms of equal protection or due process of
law%,. Space limitations prevent an adequate treatment of these,
but some of them are briefly noted in the footnotes. He generally
upheld the power of government to use its powers of taxation
and regulation to secure planned social and economic reforms.
That his example has had important influence in current develop-
ments of constitutional law no one would deny. Much has in fact
7"St. Louis Cotton Press Co. v. Arkansas, (1922) 260 U. S. 346, 43
S. Ct. 125, 67 L. Ed. 297.
78(1938) 303 U. S. 77, 58 S. Ct. 438, 82 L. Ed. 673.
V,(1926) 270 U. S. 426, 46 S. Ct. 331, 70 L. Ed. 664.
338 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
been written which describes him as a social or economic reformer.
This, however, departs from the essential character of his thinking
and approach, and conflicts with many positive statements in his
opinions. He was eminently a legal scientist. As law becomes a
science it falls into accord with impartial justice; it becomes the
basis of order and stability in the state; it becomes capable of
endless development and orderly growth; it makes possible a
free government among free men. It seems to me that such was
Justice Holmes' theory of the law and the essential basis of the
contribution he made to our culture and civilization. Such is what
I have sought to bring out here by analysis.
